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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") shares
jurisdiction with the states over matters that fundamentally affect
investment in critical energy infrastructure.1 In general, FERC's
policies have favored investment in assets that have the lowest short-
term incremental cost,2 while state policies have tended to take a
longer-term view and consider a variety of different factors,
including fuel diversity, environmental impacts such as global
warming emissions, security and sustainability of supply, economic
development, stability of retail rates, and other public interest
considerations .
Significant conflicts between FERC policies and state priorities
have, so far, been resolved in favor of FERC by the federal courts.4
* Ms. Sullivan is Chairperson at the Law Office of Julia E. Sullivan, LLC. She has
represented energy companies in state and federal regulatory proceedings for
twenty-seven years.
1. See Federal Power Act § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
2. See discussion, infra Part V.B.
3. See discussion, infra Parts VI.A-VI.C.
4. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. F.E.R.C., 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014); PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). See also Miss. Power & Light Co. v.
Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372 (1988) ("States may not bar regulated
utilities from passing through to retail consumers FERC-mandated wholesale
rates.... When FERC sets a rate between a seller of power and a wholesaler-as-
buyer, a State may not exercise its undoubted jurisdiction over retail sales to
prevent the wholesaler-as-seller from recovering the costs of paying the FERC-
approved rate.") (internal quotations omitted); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) ("A State must rather give effect to
Congress' desire to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates,
and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.").
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Courts have cited the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 5
which requires state policies to yield in areas where FERC has
exclusive jurisdiction.6
However, federal law also preserves important responsibilities to
the states.7  To the extent that federal policy could impede the
accomplishment of the states' legitimate objectives in areas
traditionally reserved to them, a collaborative approach should be
adopted. The November 2014 joint technical conference between
FERC and the New York Public Service Commission ("NYPSC") to
discuss issues of mutual interest and concern regarding wholesale
markets and energy infrastructure in New York is a good example of
the type of collaboration that may become increasingly necessary to
reconcile sometimes conflicting federal and state regulatory
priorities, provide market participants a reasonable degree of market
stability, and minimize future litigation.8
II. GENERATION ASSETS ARE NOT FUNGIBLE.
There are different types of generation assets, each with its own
potential risks, benefits, and challenges. 9 The different types of
generation assets include, for example, coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear,
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 840 (D. Md.
2013), aff'd, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014); Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at
371 ("Our decision in Nantahala relied on fundamental principles concerning the
pre-emptive impact of federal jurisdiction over wholesale rates on state
regulation.... This principle binds both state and federal courts and is in the
former respect mandated by the Supremacy Clause.").
7. See discussion, infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
8. See Notice of Joint Technical Conference, Joint Technical Conference on
N.Y Mkts. & Infrastructure, No. AD14-18-000 (F.E.R.C. Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/EventDetails.aspx?ID-753 l&CalType
-&CalendarID-1 16&Date- 11/05/2014&View-Listview, archived at
http://perma.ccVS26-TMGQ.
9. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY:
JAN. 2015; e.g., TABLE E S 1.A, available at
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm tablegrapher.cfm?t-epmt 1_01,
archived at http://perma.cc/KS42-2P4E (listing "Total Electric Power Industry
Summary Statistics" for coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, wind,
solar, biomass, geothermal).
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cogeneration, geothermal, hydropower, biomass, wind, and solar. 10
Key differences among asset types include:
Total cost. The total cost of construction, operation, and
maintenance can vary significantly by asset type.11 Investment
decisions necessarily rely upon estimates of future engineering,
procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance costs. This
introduces uncertainty and risk, particularly with respect to new or
emerging technologies. There are many instances where substantial,
and in some cases unforeseeable, variances between estimated and
actual costs resulted in protracted litigation and controversy, most
notably in the nuclear power industry.12
Fixed vs. variable costs. In general, the capital cost of an asset is
considered a "fixed cost," meaning that the cost has been
permanently and irrevocably incurred whether or not the asset is
actually dispatched to generate electricity. Operation and
maintenance expenses, including fuel, are "variable" and not fixed,
meaning that if the asset is not used, the costs are avoidable. 13 The
higher the fixed costs, the greater the economic loss if the asset is
under-utilized. Thus, assets with high fixed costs may be riskier than
10. See id.
11. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR
UTILITY SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS: APRIL 2013, at 6-7,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated capcost.pdf
12. See discussion infra Part VI.D; UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
NUCLEAR LOAN GUARANTEES: ANOTHER TAXPAYER BAILOUT? (2009), available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nuclearpower/n
uclear-loan-guarantees-_fact-sheet .pdf, archived at http://perma.ccV8GW-Q3Q3;
Anya Litvak, Westinghouse Clashes with Georgia Power Over Nuclear Plant Cost
Overruns, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2013, http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/businessnews/2013/10/20/Westinghouse-clashes-with-
Georgia-Power-over-nuclear-plant-cost-overruns/stories/201310200290, archived
at http://perma.cc/EA6W-ENY9; Nick Woltman, Xcel Energy Sued Over Prairie
Island Cost Overruns, TWINCITIES.COM, Nov. 14, 2014,
http://www.twincities.com/business/ci 26940496/xcel-energy-sued-over-prairie-
island-cost-overruns, archived at http://perma.cc/6QN6-HF7Q.
13. See, e.g., CNG Transmission Corp., 80 F.E.R.C. 61,092, at 61,322, n.12,
Ordering Paragraphs (D), (P) (1997) (acknowledging operation and maintenance
expenses and fuel as variable costs); PacifiCorp, 143 F.E.R.C. 61,167, at PP 4, 7
(2013) (referring to "variable costs (e.g., fuel and variable operation and
maintenances expenses)"); OREG 1, Inc., 138 F.E.R.C. 61,110, at P 19 (2012)
(same).
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assets with lower fixed costs, even if the total expected cost is
similar.
Different asset types have different ratios of fixed vs. variable
cost. 14 For example, renewable energy assets have relatively high
fixed costs and low variable costs. Gas-fired generation has lower
fixed costs but potentially significant variable costs, depending upon
the price of fuel. 15 One benefit of gas-fired generation is that it can
be economic even with relatively low utilization; this is one reason
why gas-fired assets are widely used for "peaking" or "back-up"
service.16
Cost volatility. Cost volatility may present cash flow and
customer satisfaction issues. 17  Renewable energy assets generally
have low cost volatility. Gas-fired assets can have relatively high cost
volatility due to dramatic fluctuations in the price of fuel.18 Rate
14. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 11 (listing varying "Overnight
Capital Costs" and "Variable O&M Costs" for coal, natural gas, nuclear, biomass,
wind, solar, geothermal, municipal solid waste, and hydroelectric generation).
15. See id. (listing the following Overnight Capital Costs - Onshore Wind:
$2,213/kW; Offshore Wind: $6,230/kW; Solar: $3,873-5,067/kW; Natural Gas
(Conventional CC): $917/kW; Natural Gas (Advanced CC): $1,023/kW). See also
INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, The Dilemma Caused by Low Cost Natural Gas
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/the-dilemma-caused-
by-low-cost-natural-gas/, archived at http://perma.cc/JB77-XB9Q ("Fixed costs for
nuclear plants run about $90,000 per megawatt compared to about $15,000 per
megawatt for new natural gas plants and about $30,000 per megawatt for coal
plants.").
16. ICF INT'L, FIRMING RENEWABLE ELECTRIC POWER GENERATORS:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR NATURAL GAS PIPELINES 4, 72-73 (Mar. 16,
2011), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?
fileID-12641276, archived at http://perma.cc/63GM-XY5U. ("Historically,
intermittent generation has been firmed by relying on various forms of back-up
generation, most notably gas-fired generation. Gas-fired generation has been a
reliable and cost-effective means of firming intermittent renewables generation.
Therefore, it has been the most widely used means to back up intermittent
generation to date.")
17. See, e.g., Patti Domm, Wild Ride For Natural Gas Signals Volatile Winter
Ahead, CNBC.coM, Nov. 10, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/102169733#,
archived at http://perma.cc/UFD9-AP29; Timothy Puko, Natural Gas Takes
Unseasonal Plunge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/natural-gas-takes-unseasonal-plunge- 1421801045, archived at
http://perma.cc/97UA-WB2X.
18. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 6 (listing variable O&M
costs of solar, wind, and geothermal plants at $0.00, and variable O&M costs of
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volatility can cause significant hardship for retail customers,
particularly residential load. 19
Reliability. Different asset types may be more or less reliable in
different conditions. Wind and solar assets are "variable" because
they can only generate energy when the wind blows or the sun
shines. While weather data can be used to create reasonable estimates
of total output over a period of time, it is necessary to have other
resources available to "back up" variable energy resources when their
20
output drops . Similarly, some assets do not perform well in
extreme cold. Significant coal-fired generation in PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM") became unavailable during the
21January 2014 "polar vortex" because coal piles froze . In the same
year, substantial gas-fired generation in the ISO New England, Inc.
("ISO-NE") region was off-line because the available fuel was
needed for heating load which had priority on the natural gas pipeline
transportation system Micro-grids and other distributed assets may
increase the reliability of the grid because power is generated near
natural gas varying from $3.60-15.45/MWh); Domm, supra note 17; Puko, supra
note 17.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 131-132.
20. See Integration of Variable Energy Res., 139 F.E.R.C. 61,246, at P 1 n.1
(2012) ("Variable Energy Resource is a device for the production of electricity that
is characterized by an energy source that: (1) is renewable; (2) cannot be stored by
the facility owner or operator; and (3) has variability that is beyond the control of
the facility owner or operator. This includes, for example, wind, solar thermal and
photovoltaic, and hydrokinetic generating facilities."); ICF INT'L, supra note 16, at
4, 72-73.
21. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, COMMISSION AND INDUSTRY
ACTIONS RELEVANT TO WINTER 2013-14 WEATHER EVENTS 5, 15 (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2014/2014-4/10-16-14-A-4-
presentation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FRV6-ZNXD; PJM
INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C., PJM CAPACITY PERFORMANCE PROPOSAL 5 (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/documents/reports/20140820-pjm-capacity-
performance-proposal.ashx, archived at http://perma.cc/U82S-KXAN ("[U]p to 22
percent of PJM capacity was unavailable due to cold weather-related problems.");
PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C., POLAR VORTEX 2014, at 6-8 (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140401084146-
Kormos,%20PJM%20Slides.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D4C9-AVBF.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 105-110.
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load, but some distribution systems are not currently designed to
23
accommodate high penetration of distributed generation.
Environmental impacts. Different asset types present different
environmental challenges. The Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and
Fukushima incidents dramatically illustrate the potential risks of
nuclear generation.24  Coal, oil, and gas-fired generation assets
25release greenhouse gases and contribute to climate change.
Hydroelectric assets may have detrimental impacts on fish
26 27populations. Wind assets may affect bird populations. Some
generation assets also impact water quality.
28
Scalability. Some asset types are more scalable than others. Solar
assets, for example, can be installed on a residential rooftop to
support distributed generation goals, while coal-fired generation
assets are generally feasible only as large, utility-scale projects.29
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION
(2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/2VKC-52U3.
24. Edward Moore Geist, What Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima
Can Teach About The Next One, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://thebulletin.org/what-three-mile-island-chernobyl-and-fukushima-can-teach-
about-next-one7104, archived at http://perma.cc/TAR8-HN94.
25. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change: Sources of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, EPA.Gov, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/
sources/electricity.html (last visited April 1, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/2M2F-TETQ.
26. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, EVALUATION OF MITIGATION
EFFECTIVENESS AT HYDROPOWER PROJECTS: FISH PASSAGE, at ix, 10 (2004)
("Hydroelectric dams can be barriers to upstream-migrating fish and a source of
mortality from turbine passage to downstream migrants.").
27. See generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N & U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13186, "RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES TO PROTECT MIGRATORY BIRDS" (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legallmou/mou-fws.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5AT7-
HDHW; Robert Bryce, Windmills Are Killing Our Birds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702037066045743765
43308399048, archived at http://perma.cc/FD8Y-QZPF.
28. See, e.g., FPL Energy Me. Hydro, 111 F.E.R.C. 61,104 (2005) (FERC
requiring state water quality certifications pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act in order for applicants to re-license hydroelectric projects).
29. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 834 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
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III. FUEL DIVERSITY IS IMPORTANT.
In order to provide safe, reliable, and reasonably priced electric
service in an environmentally responsible manner, it is important to
have a diverse portfolio of generation assets. "Fuel diversity" is
important for a number of reasons.
Price volatility. Resource diversity helps mitigate price volatility.
For example, the price of natural gas directly impacts the price of
energy that is produced by gas-fired generation assets. Historically,
the price of gas has been extremely volatile and unpredictable. This
can cause retail rates to fluctuate unpredictably, creating cash flow
issues and customer dissatisfaction. A diverse portfolio - particularly
the deployment of renewable energy assets - can help smooth out
retail rate fluctuations.
Reliability risk. Resource diversity is an important way to avoid
potential catastrophic issues with a single class of generation. For
example, during January 2014, gas-fired generation was highly
constrained in some areas due to inadequate fuel delivery
infrastructure. 30  The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio recently
observed that "fuel diversity is extremely important" because with "a
significant portion of the retiring megawatts being replaced by
natural gas resources, we cannot afford to forget about protecting our
current resources that help in hedging against any unforeseen natural
gas curtailments. 31
adaptability of solar, including use as "small-scale generation facilities that might
diversify the types of fuel used to generate electricity and reduce reliance on large,
centralized power plants"); Rooftop Solar Cost Competitive with the Grid in Much
of the U.S., Sci. AM., Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
rooftop-solar-cost-competitive-with-the-grid-in-much-of-the-u-s/, archived at
http://perma.cc/EZ6W-4JTG (noting that "the cost of putting solar panels on a
typical American house has fallen by some 70 percent over the last decade and a
half'); DAVID FELDMAN (NREL), ET AL., PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM PRICING TRENDS
22 (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/62558.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/B6K4-J5FC (same).
30. See infra text accompanying note 108.
31. Comments Submitted on Behalf of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
at 7-8, Technical Conference on Winter 2013-2014 Operations & Mkt.
Performance in Reg'l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators (May 15, 2014)
(F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD14-8-000), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
common/opennat.asp?fileID-13546266, archived at http://perma.cc/2C2J-MRM3.
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Environmental responsibility. Efforts to achieve sustainability,
energy independence, and environmental responsibility call for
increasing investment in renewable energy resources that can only
produce power intermittently. Other assets, such as storage,
dispatchable demand response, and conventional generation, are
required to support increasing levels of investment in renewable
energy.32 Some assets are better suited than others to support the
33integration of new renewable energy resources.
Distributed generation. Distributed generation can provide
unique benefits such as customer empowerment, satisfaction, and
engagement, and increased grid resiliency and security, but these
investments consist in part of roof-top solar panels that must be
34backed-up with other assets. In addition, in some areas, such as
Hawaii, significant distribution system upgrades may be needed in
order to support the integration of additional distributed assets.
IV. STATES HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN ENSURING ADEQUATE
INVESTMENT IN A DIVERSE PORTFOLIO OF GENERATION ASSETS.
States comprehensively regulate the delivery of electric service to
retail customers.35  States have "a legitimate interest and federally
permissible role in securing an adequate supply of electric energy.,
36
The Federal Power Act explicitly preserves state jurisdiction over
certain areas of the electric industry, including (but not limited to)
regulation of retail electric service and the siting and construction of
physical facilities used for the generation, distribution, and
32. See ICF INT'L, supra note 16, at 12 ("Demand response programs and
energy storage technologies may become key renewable firming resources as DR
programs grow and storage technologies mature and costs decline.").
33. See ICF INT'L, supra note 16.
34. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR
EXPANSION (2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7RTL-ZJX4.
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) ("The Commission... shall not have
jurisdiction.., over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over
facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in
intrastate commerce ....").
36. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 829 (D. Md. 2013)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 824o(i); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 5-101(a)), aff'd, 753 F.3d
467 (4th Cir. 2014).
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transmission of electric energy.37 Among other things, states can: (1)
take regulatory action to require existing generation facilities to
retire; (2) limit the type or amount of generation facilities constructed
in the state; (3) promote certain environmentally desired types of
generation facilities; and (4) determine the siting or location of a new
generation facility within the state.38
Across the nation, states have demonstrated strong leadership in
creating and implementing policies, programs, and procedures to
incentivize the development of a diverse portfolio of generation
assets to serve retail electric load safely, reliably, responsibly, and at
just and reasonable rates.39 Policies and programs include renewable
portfolio standards that require minimum percentages of retail load to
be served with renewable energy assets, 40 market-based programs
and C02 emission performance standards that require C02 emission
37. New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 22-24 (2002). With the Federal Power
Act, Congress placed "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce
and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" under federal
control. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). Through the Act, Congress exercised its
Commerce Clause prerogative to regulate matters of interstate commerce that the
states could not. Cf Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co.,
273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927) (holding that the regulation of wholesale energy
transactions that are "fundamentally interstate from beginning to end" may come
only from the "exercise of the power vested in Congress."). Congress further
extended federal authority to those electric energy matters indirectly related to
interstate commerce that had previously been subject to state regulation. See New
York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. at 6. But Congress preserved state authority over many
aspects of the electric energy industry. The Federal Power Act disclaimed any
attempt to regulate "any other sale of electric energy" and declared that federal
regulators "shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided ... over
facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce."
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). FERC has no authority or power to order directly the siting,
building, or construction of a generation facility generally or in any particular
location within a state. So while the federal government has exclusive control over
interstate rates and transmission, the "[n]eed for new power facilities, their
economic feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have been
characteristically governed by the States." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
38. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
39. See discussion, infra Part VI.
40. See, e.g., DSIRE, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies (2014), available
at http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
RPSmap.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T4U3-N6AC.
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controls on new and existing generation assets, 4 1 energy efficiency
standards and demand response programs that alter the number and
mix of energy resources by reducing energy demand, 42 and integrated
resource planning processes that require detailed, long-term planning
and analysis of the relative risks and benefits of alternative supply
options .43
States vary in their regulatory structures, electricity generation and
usage patterns, physical access to fuel and transmission networks,
and economic drivers, and they tailor their energy and environmental
policies and programs accordingly. In some states, utilities are
vertically integrated, meaning that one company is responsible for
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in a given
geographic service territory. 44  In other states, where the electric
power industry has been restructured, ownership of electric
generation assets has been decoupled from operation of transmission
and distribution assets, and retail customers have their choice of
electricity suppliers.45
41. See, e.g., OR. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OREGON'S CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION
STANDARDS FOR NEW ENERGY FACILITIES (2010), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/energy/Siting/docs/Reports/CO2Standard.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/DU7X-QAEG; BOSSELMAN, supra note 29, at 810 (discussing MA
and NH emissions reduction requirements for existing power plants, and OR and
WA emissions requirements for new power plants).
42. See Inst. for Bldg. Efficiency, Smart Grids and Smart Buildings: Demand
Response Programs Across the U.S. (June 2011),
http://www.institutebe.com/smart-grid-smart-building/demand-response-us.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/5LG8-LX2C (containing interactive map of state-by-
state demand response programs).
43. See generally RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, SYNAPSE ENERGY
ECON., INC., A BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES
AND REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 28, 2011).
44. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, STATUS OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING
BY STATE (Sept. 2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/
restructure elect.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K98C-8DJ3.
45. See id.
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Figure 1; Status of Eiltrity Rest uctuling y State
Electric ty Restruct
SurC: "SIius iof ResLrUILdigb' ShSLt ', .S. EtieYr Inrbi JLn iouAdir isli i in, acu ed Mdelu 19, 2014,
http /kwww.eia .gvf/electridtv/pohicies/reslructurin._restTr --u elecihm.
Utilities in restructured states do not own generation assets and,
therefore, must rely on wholesale energy markets to supply their full
requirements. Although restructured states retain jurisdiction over
retail service and the development, location, and type of power plants
to be constructed within their borders, the FERC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the prices, terms, and conditions of service in
wholesale electric markets.46 A federal court recently explained,
"[w]hile there exist legitimate ways in which states may secure the
development of generation facilities, states may not do so by
dictating the ultimate price received by the generation facility for its
actual wholesale energy and capacity sales in the [wholesale electric
markets] without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause [of the U.S.
Constitution] "47
46. See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966
(1986) ("FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged
Nantahala's interstate wholesale customers.... Once FERC sets such a rate, a
State may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale
rates are unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress' desire to give
FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the
States do not interfere with this authority.").
47. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 840 (D. Md.
2013), aff'd, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
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In many restructured states, regulators no longer use traditional,
long-term integrated resource planning processes to determine when
it will be necessary to invest in additional infrastructure and what
type of assets should be built; instead, those decisions are largely
dictated by the FERC-regulated wholesale markets. 48  Thus, for
example, under the New York Independent System Operator
("NYISO") market structure, "generation and other resources are not
per se planned, but are intended to respond to market signals.,
49
Restructured states cannot meet their obligation to ensure safe and
reliable retail service at just and reasonable rates unless the wholesale
markets perform. Yet it is increasingly apparent that FERC-regulated
wholesale markets are not structured in a manner that is designed to
achieve all of the energy goals that, traditionally, have been
important to the states, such as fuel diversity, generation diversity,
limiting environmental externalities including global warming
emissions, security and sustainability, economic development, retail
rate stability, and other public policy considerations that are critical
to the states.5 °  The result has been an increasingly litigious
relationship among federal regulators (who continue to place their
faith in organized markets), state regulators (who are increasingly
dissatisfied with wholesale market outcomes), and investors (who
seek to preserve the value of existing assets by opposing targeted
subsidies and incentives).
48. RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., BEST
PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING, EXAMPLES OF
STATE REGULATIONS AND RECENT UTILITY PLANS 3 (June 2013). Some states,
such as New York, retained residual authority to order utilities to invest in
reliability backstop projects in the event of market failure. However, the exercise
of such power can be controversial due to potential market impacts. See infra Part
VI.C.
49. Comments of Raymond P. Kinney, P.E., Director-Transmission NYSEG &
RGE, on Behalf of the NY Investor Owned Utilities 4, Joint Technical Conference
on N.Y. Mkts & Infrastructure, No. AD 14-18-000 (F.E.R.C. Nov. 5, 2014).
50. See discussion, infra Part V.B.
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V. STATES HAVE NOT BEEN ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOMES
OF ORGANIZED WHOLESALE MARKETS.
A. FERC's wholesale rules significantly affect the resource
portfolio that will be available, in the future, to satisfy retail load.
Independent system operators ("ISOs") and regional transmission
organizations ("RTOs") were created to facilitate open access to the
transmission grid and the development of competitive power
markets.51  Vertically integrated utilities were not economically
motivated to interconnect competitive suppliers, who complained of
52
undue discrimination. ISOs and RTOs were created to operate the
transmission grid in a non-discriminatory manner. 53 ISO/RTOs also
facilitated economically efficient coordination among transmission
owners in broad geographic regions.
54
Currently, there are three single-state ISO/RTOs and four multi-
state ISO/RTOs. The single-state ISO/RTOs are California
Independent System Operator ("CAISO") in California; Electric
Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT") in Texas; and NYISO in
New York. The multi-state ISO/RTOs are PJM, Midcontinent
Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO"), ISO-NE, and the
Southwest Power Pool.
51. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Servs. by Pub. Utils.; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Pub. Utils. &Transmitting Utils., Order No. 888, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 31,036,
at 31,654-55 (1996) (discussing the "functional unbundling" of the wholesale
generation and transmission services and that ISOs have "great potential ... to
facilitate economically efficient pricing"), order on reh 'g, Order No. 888-A,
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 31,048, order on reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 F.E.R.C.
61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. 61,046 (1998),
aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v.
F.E.R.C., 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. F.E.R.C.,
535 U.S. 1 (2002).
52. See id. ("Following PURPA .... [M]any traditional vertically integrated
utilities still did not provide open access to third parties and still favored their own
generation if and when they provided transmission access to third parties, barriers
continued to exist to cheaper, more efficient generation sources.").
53. See Reg'l Transmission Orgs., Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285, slip.
op. at 194 (1999), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-
docs/RM99-2A.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FQ7Y-495E.
54. See id., slip op at 492-497 (discussing interregional coordination).
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Figure 2 - FERC ISO/RTO Map55
FERC allows but does not require ISO/RTOs to operate power
exchanges.5 6 The form of the power exchange can differ from region
to region.57 In general, there are three types of exchanges: capacity,
energy, and ancillary services. For purposes of this Article, capacity
markets are the most relevant.
"Capacity" is a standby commitment made by a generation owner
5 8to produce electric energy if called upon by the ISO/RTO to do so.
A purchase of capacity is not a purchase of electric energy; rather, it
is a purchase of a commitment that the unit will be available to
produce electric energy if called upon.5 9 The purchase and sale of
capacity ensures that at any given time there should be adequate
resources capable of supplying energy to serve forecasted load, as
well as a reserve margin to meet exigent circumstances, such as an
unexpectedly high demand or generation outages. In real time, the
55. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO) (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp, archived at
http://perma.cc/4RRP-TFFN.
56. Reg'l Transmission Orgs., Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285, slip op. at
608 (1999).
57. Id.
58. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. F.E.R.C., 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
59. See id.
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system operator may elect to dispatch a cheaper resource that was not
reserved through payment of a capacity charge, but the capacity
product remains valuable to support reliability.
In addition to the general benefits of ensuring an adequate amount
of capacity to satisfy load, capacity sales are a source of revenue for
asset owners. 60 A generator that clears the capacity market in a year
(for example, 2015) will have a fixed stream of revenue for a one-
year period commencing up to three years in the future (for example,
from 2018 to 2019).61 This fixed stream of revenue can help the
generator obtain current financing to fund new construction and/or
62operation and maintenance of existing assets. The availability of
this revenue stream also allows cleared capacity resources to offer
lower prices in the real-time energy markets. As a practical matter,
in ISO/RTOs that have them, it is challenging for a project proponent
to operate economically if their asset does not clear the forward
capacity market.63 Thus, FERC's capacity market rules significantly
affect the resource portfolio that is available to meet customer
demand.
B. Organized capacity markets are not designed to value state
policy goals
64FERC did not dictate a standard design for capacity markets. In
general, all of the existing capacity markets are bid-based markets in
which resources clear on the basis of price for a single delivery year
commencing up to three years forward. 65 But as many states learnedthrough years of experience in the integrated resource planning
60. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 807 (D. Md.
2013), aff'd, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Some market participants have argued that it is difficult to obtain financing
for new construction even if the asset does clear the forward capacity market. See
id. at 818, 822 (discussing CPV and MD PSC concerns that the PJM Capacity
Market is "too short-term, too volatile, and too fraught with continued regulatory
uncertainty to provide lenders with anything close to the certainty of a fixed
revenue stream required for financing").
64. Reg'l Transmission Orgs., Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285, slip op. at
608 (1999) ("[W]e think that it is best to let market preferences dictate the form of
any one or more regional power exchanges and whether the RTO should operate a
power exchange.").
65. See, e.g., Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 805-06.
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process, the option that is the cheapest for any single year may be
more expensive than available alternatives over the twenty- or thirty-
year life of a generation asset.66 The cheapest option also may be too
risky due to a lack of fuel diversity, lack of firm fuel supplies, or
externalities such as environmental impacts. As a result, generation
portfolios in jurisdictions with organized capacity markets may not
align well with long-term state policy objectives that go beyond
achieving the lowest short-term price.
1. Fuel Diversity
In general, FERC has attempted to develop policies that are "fuel
neutral," meaning that the facility that offers the lowest price will
clear the market regardless of technology type. FERC Commissioner
Norman Bay has stated that "FERC policies should be fuel neutral
while allowing non-discriminatory access to FERC-jurisdictional
markets. 67 According to Commissioner Bay, there are not currently
any FERC policies that promote one fuel type or energy source over
another.68
As a practical matter, a significant amount of the new generation
that has entered the market in recent years has been gas-fired
generation. Though this result may not have been the intended result
of FERC policies, it has significant long-term implications. The New
York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC") observed that "the
current market structure appears to limit the merchant generator
66. For example, if gas prices are expected to rise, a natural gas facility may be
the least cost alternative for the short term but not for the medium or long term.
67. Hearing to Consider the Nominations of Ms. Cheryl A. LaFleur & Mr.
Norman C. Bay, to Be Members of the Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n Before the
S. Comm. On Energy & Natural Res., 113th Cong. (May 20, 2014) (responses to
Questions for the Record of Norman Bay, nominee for Commissioner, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission).
68. See id. (response to Question 8 of Senator Joe Manchin). FERC approved
two winter reliability programs in ISO New England that specifically sought to
achieve fuel diversity to mitigate the risks associated with inadequate natural gas
delivery infrastructure. ISO New England Inc., 148 F.E.R.C. 61,179 (2014)
(accepting 2014-2015 Winter Reliability Program); ISO New England, Inc., 144
F.E.R.C. 61,204 (2013) (accepting 2013-2014 Winter Reliability Program).
Nuclear and coal-based assets are ineligible for the incentive even though they have
(and pay for) long-term firm fuel and fuel transportation, but the Commission
found that this did not render the program "unduly discriminatory." ISO New
England Inc., 148 F.E.R.C. 61,179, at P 43 (2014). See also infra note 139.
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options being chosen to natural gas-fired,, 69 even though that option
may not be in the long-term best interests of the public:
The lower initial investment and faster pay-back of natural
gas fired units may explain why gas generation appears to
be the market's choice. However, investing in nothing but
non-renewable natural gas-fired generation for the next
decade might result in a significant increase in fuel risk, an
increase in wholesale price volatility, and a decrease in fuel
diversity. There is no current forum where such questions
are being considered.
70
The NY PSC concluded:
[T]he investment risks or above-market costs of new, more
expensive technologies that provide environmental,
hedging, fuel diversity, or other benefits are high enough
that financial markets seem unwilling to accept them on a
pure merchant basis. An energy policy that calls for a more
diversified portfolio of generation fuel than strictly natural
gas is not expected to succeed if left to today's market
structure.71
Under the current market rules,
The units that will be retired by the market will be the least
efficient and most costly to operate, hence the least
profitable, while the public might be better served by
retiring the unit with the greatest pollution or the unit that
presents the greatest risks to the safety of the surrounding
1 72
community.
69. Order Initiating Electricity Reliability and Infrastructure Planning at 11,
Proceeding on Motion of the Comm 'n to Establish Long-Range Elec. Res. Plan &
Infrastructure Planning Process, Case 07-E-1507 (NY PSC Dec 24, 2007).
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 22-23.
72. Id. at 11.
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NYISO's President and Chief Executive Officer has acknowledged
that "there is a great deal of concern about fuel diversity.
73
2. Long-Term Investment in Natural Gas Delivery Infrastructure
According to NYISO's independent market monitor, "in an ideal
market, market requirements should be fully consistent with the
reliability requirements of the system," but in reality "no market
today sets prices that fully reflect all system needs., 74 To maintain
reliability, ISO/RTO tariffs permit out-of-market payments to
incentivize new construction,'75 delay mothballing or shut-down of
existing units,76 and/or provide emergency service when outages
occur.
7 7 However, to date, there is no tariff or market mechanism to
support financing of long-term investments in natural gas delivery
infrastructure that is needed to support reliability in regions that are
heavily dependent on natural gas-fired generation.
Recently, significant reliability threats and cost increases have
occurred due to inadequate natural gas supply arrangements,
73. Introductory Comments of Stephen G. Whitley, President and CEO, New
York Independent System Operator, Inc. at 5, Joint Tech. Conference on N. Y Mkts.
& Infrastructure, No. AD14-18-000 (F.E.R.C. Nov. 5, 2014).
74. Answer of New York Independent System Operator, Inc. at 12, Indep.
Power Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., F.E.R.C. Docket
No. EL13-62 (May 30, 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted),
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID-13270787, archived at
http://perma.cc/9GWQ-7MRH.
75. See, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., F.E.R.C Open Access
Transmission Tariff, Attachment Y - NYISO Comprehensive Planning Process
for Reliability Needs §§ 31.2.4 (Development of Solutions to Reliability Needs),
31.5 (Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery).
76. Order Deciding Reliability Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and
Recovery at 2-3, Petition of Dunkirk Power LLC & NRG Energy, Inc. for Waiver
of Generator Retirement Requirements, No. 12-E-0136, (NY PSC Aug. 16,
2012); Order Deciding Reliability Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and
Recovery at 15-16, 20r, Petition of Cayuga Operating Co., LLC to Mothball
Generating Units 1 & 2, No. 12-E-0400 (NY PSC Dec. 17, 2012); see also
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff § V.113-114 (permitting either cost of
service recovery or a Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit for generation that
continues operating beyond its desired Deactivation Date).
77. See, e.g., PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, Attachment K - Appendix
§§ 2.2(d), 2.5(d) (discussing shortage pricing in the event of reserve shortages and
emergency conditions).
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.78Folwntw eparticularly in New England. Following two technical conferences
regarding poor generator performance during the January 2014 "polar
vortex," FERC explained:
As currently designed, the eastern capacity market auctions
establish capacity prices based on economic bids of sellers,
but do not directly take into account generator type, fuel
supply arrangements, or operational characteristics. The
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.'s (MISO)
resource adequacy construct operates similarly in that it
does not directly account for fuel assurance concerns.
Additionally, experiences in RTO/ISO regions without
centralized capacity markets, such as the California
Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) and
the Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) suggest that similar
fuel assurance concerns may exist in those regions.79
The Maine Public Utilities Commission ("MePUC") concluded
that (1) the market rules do not provide incentives to generators to
make the investment in natural gas delivery infrastructure that is
needed for reliability; and/or (2) a mismatch exists between the
nature of the required commitment to acquire pipeline capacity,
which is long-term, and the nature of a generator's revenue stream,
which is relatively much shorter term, and thereby precludes a
generator from being a credit-worthy counterparty to support long-
term investments in natural gas delivery infrastructure. 80
The New England States Committee on Electricity ("NESCOE")
expressed concern regarding the lack of investment in natural gas
delivery infrastructure:
The majority of proposed electric power generators in New
England are to be fueled by natural gas. However, to date,
78. ISO NEW ENGLAND, 2014 REGIONAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 7, 30 (2014)
("In 2013, New England had the highest natural gas prices in the country, primarily
because of insufficient pipeline capacity."). See also infra note 108.
79. Centralized Capacity Mkts. in Reg'l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys.
Operators, 149 F.E.R.C. 61,145, at P 6 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
80. Order - Phase 1, at 21, Me. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n Investigation of Parameters
for Exercising Auth. Pursuant to the Me. Energy Cost Reduction Act, No. 2014-
00071 (Me PUC Nov. 13, 2014).
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New England's electricity markets have not resulted in
infrastructure to meet current gas-fired generators' needs.
For example, there is no evidence that any electric power
generator in New England has signed a long-term firm
contract with a natural gas pipeline based on the current or
expected market rules.81
NESCOE has proposed tariff changes intended to address the need
for long-term investment in natural gas delivery infrastructure, but
those proposals appear to be stalled. 82 The North American Electric
Reliability Council ("NERC") recently stated that, "in New England,
a large natural gas-fired generation portfolio has created challenges
in ensuring that natural gas can be supplied and transported to all
generators that are needed to maintain electric reliability.,
83
3. Long-Term Investment in New Generation
The CEO of American Electric Power recently testified, "From my
perspective, the current structure of the capacity markets is not
attracting a mix of new generating resources that will keep the lights
on, nor providing the correct pricing signals for the existing fleet.,
84
Two studies by the American Public Power Association found that
nearly all of the generation capacity that came on-line during the
study periods (2011 and 2013) was supported by long-term bilateral
contracts, and was not built to make speculative sales into organized
85markets. A company that was proposing a new generation project
in PJM explained:
81. Press Release, New England States Comm. on Elec., Observations on New
England Power Generators Association's Advice to New England Electricity
Consumers and View of Status Quo 2 (Nov. 14, 2014).
82. See discussion infra note 119.
83. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2014 SUMMER RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT: MAY 2014 1 (2014).
84. Hearing on the Impact of Generation Retirements on Elec. Reliability
Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources (Apr. 10, 2014) (testimony of
Nicholas K. Akins, Chairman, President, and CEO, American Electric Power).
85. AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, POWER PLANTS ARE NOT BUILT ON SPEC: 2014
UPDATE 6 (2014).
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RPM's[ 86] conditional three-year commitment period is
simply insufficient to allow new baseload generation to be
financed [because] the RPM is too short-term, too volatile,
and too fraught with continued regulatory uncertainty to
provide lenders with anything close to the certainty of a
87fixed revenue stream required for financing.
NERC identified near-term reliability concerns in markets
overseen by MISO and NYISO, where anticipated reserve margins
are projected to fall below target levels in 2016 and 2017,
respectively." NERC said the most immediate reliability problems
loom in MISO, where anticipated power reserve margins will drop
below the target level of 14.8 percent in 2016 and decline to a razor-
thin 5.23 percent by 2024. 89 NERC said the problem is driven by
coal plant retirements, a failure to build or plan new baseload
generation, and increased power exports to PJM. 90 NERC also
identified reliability issues in four regions of New York.91 Capacity
additions are needed to alleviate such resource adequacy concerns.
The Maryland Public Service Commission ("MdPSC") concluded
that the state could no longer rely on the organized capacity market to
deliver long-term investment in new generation needed to serve retail
load:
[O]f critical importance, we cannot rely on PJM's
Reliability Pricing Model to deliver new generation to
86. The Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM") is PJM's capacity market model.
Under the RPM, PJM conducts one base residual auction and up to three
incremental auctions per delivery year (June 1 - May 31). The base residual
auction occurs three years before the commitment period, and the incremental
auctions occur two years, one year, and just before the commitment period. The
capacity auctions under the RPM obtain the remaining capacity that is needed after
market participants have committed the resources they will supply themselves or
provide through bilateral contracts.
87. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 818 (D. Md. 2013)
(quoting 2009 CPV motion for a long-term contract in MD PSC Case 9117), aff'd,
753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
88. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2014 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT 5-6 (2014).
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 39.
91. Id. at 6.
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Maryland.... Since its inception in 2007, RPM has
brought no new generation to Maryland, in spite of the fact
that clearing prices for capacity in [PJM's] SWMAAC
[zone] have averaged almost double those of the non-
constrained portions of PJM.... Despite these exorbitant
capacity charges, which have increased energy costs to
Maryland ratepayers by hundreds of millions of dollars, no
new base load generation was bid into the [PJM base
residual auction] during the 2012-2014 delivery period.
Zero. The simple fact is that the one year signal, three
years into the future has not provided sufficient certainty
for prospective generation suppliers to secure financing in
the current economic climate. And we do not find it
reasonable to require us ... to entrust the reliability of our
State's electricity supply entirely to the operation of a
capacity market that, by design, seeks to incent long-term
92assets solely through short-term price signals.
The New Jersey legislature similarly found that PJM's capacity
market "has not resulted in large additions of peaking facilities or any
additions of intermediate or base load resources available to the
region and the State.",93 As discussed below, both states took bold
action to support investment in new generation capacity, but those
efforts were nixed by the federal courts under the Supremacy
Clause.94
4. Environmental Impacts
The NYPSC found that organized wholesale markets are "not
designed to consider a number of public policy concerns," including
carbon emissions. 95  "No matter how well designed or operated,
92. Order No. 84815, at 22-23, In re Whether New Generating Facilities are
Needed to Meet Long-Term Demand for Standard Offer Serv., No. 9214 (Apr. 12,
2012).
93. N.J. Stat. § 48:3-98.2(b), invalidated by PPL Energyplus v. Solomon, 766
F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
94. See infra Parts VI.B.i, VI.B.ii.
95. Order Initiating Electricity Reliability and Infrastructure Planning at 9-10,
Proceeding on Motion of the Comm 'n to Establish Long-Range Elec. Res. Plan &
Infrastructure Planning Process, Nos. 07-E-1507, et al. (NYPSC Dec 24, 2007)
(footnote omitted).
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markets can only respond to internalized costs, and many of the
State's concerns and goals are not internalized in the wholesale
market. ,
9 6
Some of the ISO/RTOs' recent efforts to address reliability have
been counterproductive from the perspective of environmental
justice. For example, ISO New England implemented "winter
reliability programs" for 2013-2014 and 2014-201597 and is
implementing a new "Pay for Performance" 98 program that
incentivize the use of fuel oil as a back-up fuel source. NESCOE
stated that "fuel oil costs about five times what natural gas costs" and
"has a dirtier emissions profile: its increase[d] use will reverse
progress on New England's environmental objectives." 99
VI. THOUGH THEY HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS AT STAKE, STATES
HAVE LIMITED POWER TO AVOID THE COSTS OR MITIGATE THE RISKS
THAT CAPACITY MARKET OUTCOMES IMPOSE ON RETAIL CUSTOMERS
Capacity market outcomes significantly impact important state
interests. NYPSC Chair Audrey Zibelman recently stated:
[T]he [NYPSC] is interested in discussing how New
York's capacity market could be improved to help attract
investments to help meet public policy objectives,
including providing affordable and resilient energy
services. Given the fact that more than $2.6 billion flows
through the capacity market annually, it is critically
important that it reflects the State's policy objectives and
the needs of consumers in the State.100
96. Id. at 10.
97. ISO New England, Inc., 148 F.E.R.C. 61,179 (2014) (accepting 2014-2015
Winter Reliability Program); ISO New England, Inc., 144 F.E.R.C. 61,204 (2013)
(accepting 2013-2014 Winter Reliability Program).
98. ISO New England, Inc., 147 F.E.R.C. 61,172 (2014).
99. Press Release, New England States Comm. on Elec., Observations on New
England Power Generators Association's Advice to New England Electricity
Consumers and View of Status Quo 2 (Nov. 14, 2014).
100. Press Release, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n & Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, PSC and FERC to Hold Joint Technical Conference 1 (Nov. 30, 2014).
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Several of the states with organized capacity markets have
concluded in recent years that it would not be prudent to rely entirely
on capacity market outcomes to ensure that load serving entities will
have access to safe, reliable, reasonably priced and environmentally
responsibile energy supplies to serve retail load. State initiatives
aimed at addressing state policy concerns have resulted in a steady
stream of litigation, some of which is still pending. 10 1 In general, the
federal courts have sided with FERC, finding that, under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state policies must yield
to FERC's market design, however flawed it might be.
10 2
A. New England
In states with traditional integrated resource planning, utilities are
generally required, when they propose to construct new gas-fired
generation resources, to secure firm, long-term gas transportation
capacity to ensure that fuel will be available when the plant is called
upon to dispatch.10 3 But in organized capacity markets, owners of
gas-fired generation assets have been permitted to rely on cheaper,
interruptible gas transportation capacity, which may not be available
during extreme weather conditions when heating load has priority
service. °4  In January 2014, gas-fired generators in ISO New
England had a capacity supply obligation of 11,000 MW, but they
only produced 3,000 MW during the peak hour because their fuel
supplies were interrupted.
10 5
101. See infra notes Part VI.B.
102. See, e.g., PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014);
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
103. E.g., Nev. Power Co., No. 08-08030, 2008 WL 5484408, at *81-88 (NPUC
Dec. 29, 2008) (order approving 2009 Nev. Power Co. Energy Supply Plan
update); Nev. Power Co., No. 08-05014, 2008 WL 4492841, at *26-28 (NPUC Oct.
1, 2008) (order accepting Nev. Power Co. application); Sierra Pac. Power Co., No.
05-8004, 247 P.U.R.4th 469, at *242 (NPUC Dec. 14, 2005) (order accepting
Sierra Pac. Power Co. application).
104. Under ISO New England's tariff, capacity resources may not take outages
based on economic decisions not to procure fuel or fuel transportation, but they are
not required to procure firm gas transportation in order to participate in the capacity
auction. New England Power Generators Ass 'n Inc. v. ISO New England Inc., 144
F.E.R.C. 61,157, at P 47 (2013).
105. Peter Brandien, Vice President, System Operations, ISO NEW ENGLAND
INC., Cold Weather Operations at 15, Winter 2013-2014 Operations & Mkt.
2015]
498 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
When outages occur, the system operator is forced to dispatch less
economic units to maintain service.1 °6  In this situation, the
uneconomic resource does not set the market-clearing price but may
be entitled to an "uplift" payment (on top of the market clearing
price) to compensate the owner for following the operator's dispatch
order. 107 ISO New England paid $73 million in uplift in January
2014, largely because of uneconomic dispatch that resulted from gas-
fired generators' reliance on interruptible fuel delivery services.
10 8
ISO-NE estimates that New England consumers paid $3 billion more
for electricity during December, January, and February of 2013-14
than they would have paid if adequate pipeline capacity from the
south existed. 109 Maine's Office of Public Advocate ("MeOPA") has
stated that winter pipeline constraints increased Maine electricity
costs by more than $180 million in the winter of 2012-13, and even
more in 2013-14, and that pipeline capacity constraints are having
significant but less easily quantified impacts on Maine's economy
and environment.
110
According to a study by Concentric Energy Advisors, ISO New
England could save hundreds of millions of dollars by investing in
incremental natural gas delivery infrastructure,111 but gas-fired
generators have no economic incentive to sign up for long-term firm
gas transportation service, and pipeline owners will not construct the
facilities without long-term firm contracts to finance their
investment.' 12 According to the MeOPA, "there is a market failure
Performance in Reg'l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators, No. AD14-8-
000 (F.E.R.C. Apr. 1, 2014).
106. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STAFF ANALYSIS OF UPLIFT IN RTO
AND ISO MARKETS: AUGUST 2014 at 1, 4.
107. See generally id.
108. Winter 2013-2014 by the Numbers, RTO INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.rtoinsider.com/winter-2013-14-numbers/, archived at
http://perma.cc/4RRP-TFFN.
109. Order - Phase 1, at 15, Me. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n Investigation of Parameters
for Exercising Auth. Pursuant to the Me. Energy Cost Reduction Act, No. 2014-
00071 (Me PUC Nov. 13, 2014).
110. Id. at 8.
111. CONCENTRIC ENERGY ADVISORS, NEW ENGLAND COST SAVINGS
ASSOCIATED WITH NEW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 6-7 (May
2012).
112. Press Release, New England States Comm. on Elec., Observations on New
England Power Generators Association's Advice to New England Electricity
Consumers and View of Status Quo 2 (Nov. 14, 2014) ("For example, there is no
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that is preventing private entities from addressing pipeline capacity
,,113
constraints.
As a "temporary," "stopgap" measure,' 14 ISO New England
implemented a "winter reliability program" for 2014-2015 that
provides out-of-market payments to some dual-fuel generators and
for a limited amount of oil and LNG inventory.1 15  ISO-NE also
adopted market rule changes known as Pay for Performance ("PFP")
in an effort to incentivize generators to "firm up" their fuel
commitments, and thus eliminate the need for the Winter Reliability
Program and similar measures. 116 The MePUC concluded that the
PFP is not likely to cause generators to invest in new natural gas
delivery infrastructure.117 According to the MePUC:
[R]ule changes, increased efficiency in electric and gas
usage, demand response, and better gas/electric market
coordination may have some impact on the margin, but we
find that those activities, even taken together, are not
sufficiently likely, or likely to be of sufficient scale, to
match the likely benefits of substantial additional gas
pipeline capacity.
118
NESCOE reached a similar conclusion:
evidence that any electric power generator in New England has signed a long-term
firm contract with a natural gas pipeline based on the current or expected market
rules. Indeed, Spectra Energy Corp had to downsize its proposed Algonquin
Incremental Market project from the size it initially proposed because only local
gas distribution companies - and no merchant electric power generators - signed
up for service.").
113. Order - Phase 1, at 8, Me. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n Investigation of Parameters
for Exercising Auth. Pursuant to the Me. Energy Cost Reduction Act, No. 2014-
00071 (Me PUC Nov. 13, 2014).
114. ISO New England Inc., 148 F.E.R.C. 61,179, at PP 2, 24, 41 (2014).
115. Id. (order accepting 2014-2015 Winter Reliability Program); see also ISO
New England, Inc., 144 F.E.R.C. 61,204 (2013) (order accepting 2013-2014
Winter Reliability Program).
116. ISO New England Inc., 148 F.E.R.C. 61,179, at P 5 n.7 (2014) (citing ISO
New England Inc., 147 F.E.R.C. 61,172 (2014)).
117. Order - Phase 1, at 32, Me. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n Investigation of Parameters
for Exercising Auth. Pursuant to the Me. Energy Cost Reduction Act, No. 2014-
00071 (Me PUC Nov. 13, 2014).
118. Id. at32.
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Despite many years of conversation about reforming
market mechanisms to address infrastructure inadequacies,
not one has been proposed that is expected to solve the
region's natural gas constraints. According to ISO-New
England's consultant, the latest capacity market reforms
approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
referred to as Pay-for-Performance, are likely to result in
greater use of fuel oil as a back-up fuel source when they
are in place a few years from now. At least currently, fuel
oil costs about five times what natural gas costs. Fuel oil
also has a dirtier emissions profile: its increase use will
reverse progress on New England's environmental
objectives.
Indeed, for the second consecutive winter in the context of
an emergency program, ISO-New England is investing
consumer dollars predominantly in stand-by oil to make
sure power generators can operate when needed, even
when they cannot access natural gas. The strategy has
emissions implications and requires consumers to pay
above and beyond market prices, but it may be only a
short-term way to help maintain power system stability. 19
119. Press Release, New England States Comm. on Elec., Observations on New
England Power Generators Association's Advice to New England Electricity
Consumers and View of Status Quo 2-3 (Nov. 14, 2014). On December 5, 2013,
the New England Governors issued a letter in which they committed to work
together, in coordination with ISO-NE and through NESCOE, to advance regional
energy infrastructure expansion. Press Release, New England Governors'
Commitment to Regional Cooperation on Energy Infrastructure Issues (Dec. 5,
2013). The NESCOE initiative identified two primary goals: (1) expand pipeline
capacity to increase natural gas supply into New England, reducing supply
constraints and associated energy price volatility, and (2) expand electric
transmission to facilitate utility-scale development and delivery of no-to-low
carbon energy resources. See NEW ENGLAND STATES COMM. ON ELEC., UPDATE
ON THE NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS' PROPOSAL TO INVEST IN STRATEGIC
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ADDRESS PRICE DISPARITIES 12 (Sept. 25, 2014). On June
20, 2014, NESCOE presented to NEPOOL a proposal on the tariff approaches for
incremental transmission and natural gas pipeline capacity with the intent of a vote
on the proposal in September 2014. Id. at 20. However, on July 31, 2014, the
Massachusetts Legislature adjourned without acting on a bill to enable that State to
procure levels of no- and/or low-carbon power, and as a result, NESCOE sought an
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During its 2013 session, the Maine Legislature enacted The Maine
Energy Cost Reduction Act, 12  authorizing the MePUC, in
consultation with the Maine Office of the Consumer Advocate and
the Governor's Energy Office, to enter into, or direct one or more
transmission and distribution utilities, natural gas utilities, or natural
gas pipeline utilities to enter into, an Energy Cost Reduction Contract
("ECRC") for long-term pipeline capacity. 12 1  The MePUC has
invited ECRC proposals and intends to perform an independent cost-
benefit analysis of each proposal to determine whether sufficient
benefits will result to Maine consumers to warrant entering an
ECRC. 12 2 Already some parties are arguing that the ECRC program
is preempted by federal law and that any ECRC would be invalid
because it would interfere with the operation of FERC-regulated
wholesale markets. 123 As of April 9, 2015, the litigation in Maine is
still pending.
B. PJM
PJM also experienced reliability challenges during unusually cold
weather conditions in January 2014. PJM set a new all-time winter
peak load of 141,846 megawatts on January 7, 2014.124 During the
peak hour, 22 percent of total installed generation capacity in PJM
extension of time on the NEPOOL vote so as to provide Massachusetts State
officials time to evaluate options associated with moving forward. Id. at 21.
120. Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, Pub. L. 2013, ch. 369, Pt. B, § 1
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 1901-1912 (2013)).
121. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 1904.2-1904.3.
122. Order - Phase 1 at 1, 3, 4, Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Investigation of
Parameters for Exercising Auth. Pursuant to the Me. Energy Cost Reduction Act,
No. 2014-00071 (Me PUC Nov. 13, 2014).
123. Id. at 28 ("Because the Act sets out a scheme that seeks to directly impact
wholesale electric and gas rates in interstate markets, CLF argues it impinges on
FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rate setting as established by the
FPA and the NGA and violates the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, CLF reasons,
the Act and any ECRCs entered into based upon it, violate the Supremacy Clause
and the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and are preempted by
the FPA and NGA.").
124. PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C., ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS AND
MARKET IMPACTS DURING THE JANUARY 2014 COLD WEATHER EVENTS 4, 9, 19,
36 (May 8, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/documents/reports/20140509-
analysis-of-operational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014-cold-
weather-events.ashx, archived at http://perma.cc/3 SJ5-D23N.
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was unavailable. 125  Generation units experienced forced outages
resulting from equipment failure, cold temperature operations, and
fuel supply issues. 126
PJM had to initiate several emergency procedures on January 6-7,
2014.127 On January 7, 2014, locational marginal prices in PJM
reached $1,800 per MWH. 121 PJM paid $597 million in uplift in
January 2014.129 Most of these costs were caused when PJM had to
call upon resources that were both inflexible and expensive in order
to maintain reliability.
130
Significant uplift payments create financial hardship for consumers
and signal real reliability threats. Acting FERC Chair LaFleur stated
at a technical conference, "I am also very concerned about price, both
the absolute magnitude of the price spikes and increases we saw this
winter, and also the variability... . [W]hen you see these price
spikes, it is a symptom that protecting reliability is causing this
issue." 131 Similarly, Commissioner Moeller testified:
After two unusually warm winters in most of the country,
our latest winter exposed an increasingly fragile balance of
supply and demand in many areas in the Eastern
Interconnection. Prices at times were extraordinarily high
and consumers used more power because of the cold
weather, which multiplied the impact of higher prices.
Consumers are now beginning to receive utility bills that in
some cases are reportedly several times what they paid
during similar periods in previous years. Although the
operators of the power grid worked hard to keep the system
working, the experience of this winter strongly suggests
125. Id. at4, 9, 24, 31, 37, 39.
126. Id. at 24-25.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 19, 27, 48.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 49.
131. Transcript at 111:6-111:15, Technical Conference on Winter 2013-2014
Operations & Mkt. Performance in RTOs & ISOs, No. AD14-8-000 (F.E.R.C. Apr.
1, 2014).
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that parts of the nation's bulk power system are in a more
132precarious situation than I had feared in years past.
FERC recently approved changes to PJM's price formation rules
that are expected to boost annual capacity payments to generators.133
Estimates of the increase range from $216 million 134 to $1.7 billion
per year. 135  On December 12, 2014, PJM filed a "Capacity
Performance Proposal," which was intended to ensure that generation
which clears the capacity auction will be available when called upon
to serve load. 136 On March 31, 2015, FERC found that the proposal
was deficient and requested additional information.137  Thus, the
proposed changes will not take effect prior to PJM's May 2015 base
residual action. Concerns about resource adequacy linger, with FERC
recently approving PJM's scarcity pricing proposal to allow cost-
based offers up to $1,800/MWh to set the price in the energy market
138through March 2015.
Some PJM states attempted to promote the development (or
retention) of generation resources in order to support reliability and
mitigate high scarcity prices for the benefit of consumers. FERC has
allowed some subsidies for renewable energy resources139 and
conventional resources needed to address a short term reliability
132. See Hearing on "Keeping the Lights On -Are We Doing Enough to Ensure
the Reliability and Security of the U.S. Electric Grid?" Before the S. Comm. on
Energy & Natural Resources, 113th Cong. (Apr. 10, 2014) (testimony of Philip D.
Moeller, Commissioner, F.E.R.C.).
133. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 149 F.E.R.C. 61,183, at PP 20, 26-27, 53
(2014).
134. Id. at P 53.
135. Protest of Maryland Public Service Commission at 1, 3, PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., No. ER14-2940-000 (F.E.R.C. Oct. 16, 2014).
136. Reforms to the Reliability Pricing Market ("RPM") and Related Rules in the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("Tariff') and Reliability Assurance
Agreement Among Load Serving Entities ("RAA"), PJM Interconnection, L.L. C.,
F.E.R.C. Docket No. ER15-623-000 (Dec. 12, 2014).
137. Letter from F.E.R.C. Office of Energy Market Regulation to PJM, PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., F.E.R.C. Docket No. ER15-623-000 (March 31, 2015).
138. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 150 F.E.R.C. 61,020 (2015).
139. ISO New England Inc., 147 F.E.R.C. 61,173, at P 81-83 (2014) (allowing
subsidies for up to 200 MW of Renewable Technology Resources in ISO New
England's forward capacity market to complement state policies promoting the
development of such assets).
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need, 14 but has rejected state sponsored price supports for baseload
conventional generation. The Third and Fourth Circuits upheld
FERC's view that state initiatives in Maryland and New Jersey were
unconstitutional.
141
1. Maryland
In May 2007, in response to concerns regarding the operation of
the wholesale market, the Maryland General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill 400,142 calling for the Maryland Public Service
Commission ("MdPSC") to study the adequacy of generation and
transmission assets in the state. 143  The MdPSC reported that
"Maryland faces a critical shortage of electricity capacity...
because Maryland sits in a highly congested portion of the regional
electric transmission system (which makes it difficult to bring more
power in) and because we use more electricity than is generated
here. 144  The MdPSC noted that the wholesale markets had not
responded to Maryland's need for additional generation and/or
transmission capacity and opined that those markets were unlikely to
140. See infra Part VI.C.
141. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. F.E.R.C., 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014); PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). See also CPV Shore, LLC, 148 F.E.R.C.
61,096 at P 30 (2014) (finding the contracts unconstitutional and invalid). Both
projects moved forward without the state subsidies, but the project sponsor claimed
that the cost of capital was higher, and the benefits to consumers will be lower,
than if the state sponsored programs had been upheld. Jamie S. Hopkins, Waldorf
Power Plant Gets Financing to Build, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 8, 2014), available at
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-08/business/bs-bz-power-plant-financing-
20140808 1 cpv-plant-competitive-power-ventures-gas-fired-plant, archived at
http://perma.cc/EWP6-Q2H8; "Christie Helps Break Ground on 845M Natural Gas
Plant in Woodbridge," NJBiz (Oct. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.njbiz.com/article/20131023/NJBIZO 1/131029916/Christie-helps-break-
ground-on-$845M-natural-gas-plant-in-Woodbridge, archived at
http://perma.cc/4QFF-6UXF.
142. S.B. 400, 2007 Md. Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2007).
143. See id.
144. MD. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PART I:
OPTIONS FOR RE-REGULATION AND NEW GENERATION 1 (Dec. 3, 2007) ("Interim
Report") (emphasis in original).
[VOL. XXVI
FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W RE VIE W
respond in the immediate future to the state's "looming capacity
shortage."
' 145
In order to induce the construction of new electric generation
facilities in Maryland, the MdPSC directed Baltimore Gas and
Electric Company, Potomac Electric Power Company, and Delmarva
Power & Light Company to enter into a Contract for Differences
("CfD") with CPV Maryland, LLC ("CPV"). 146 Under the CfD, CPV
agreed to:
" Construct, own, operate, and maintain a generation facility
physically located within the SWMAAC zone of PJM
(which includes portions of Maryland and the District of
Columbia);
• "[W]arrant[] that the Facility... will participate in and
offer [its output and products] into all PJM Markets...
including but not limited to the [Base Residual Auction],
the Day-Ahead Energy Market, Real-Time Energy Market
and the Ancillary Services Market consistent with PJM
Rules;"
" Not enter into any "bilateral contract or other arrangement
to sell any of its output, products or services,... with
another third party, PJM, or any Government Agency
during the Term of the Agreement, unless approved by the
[MdPSC];"
• Beginning on the Commercial Operation Date, have the
generation facility offer and participate in the PJM
Wholesale Energy Market and Capacity Market and submit
only cost-based offers; and
• Engage in a monthly compensation scheme with the
Maryland [electric distribution companies] based upon a
comparison of the revenue received by CPV for its actual
sales of energy and capacity into the PJM Markets and the
145. Id.
146. Order No. 84815 at 27, In the Matter of Whether New Generating Facilities
Are Needed to Meet Long-Term Demand for Standard Offer Serv., No. 9214 (Md.
PSC Apr. 12, 2012) ("Generation Order").
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"contract price" for energy and capacity provided for in the
CUD. 
1 4 7
A federal district court invalidated Maryland's program, finding
that it violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
While Maryland may retain traditional state authority to
regulate the development, location, and type of power
plants within its borders, the scope of Maryland's power is
necessarily limited by FERC's exclusive authority to set
wholesale energy and capacity prices under, inter alia, the
Supremacy Clause and the field preemption doctrine.
Based on this principle, Maryland cannot secure the
development of a new power plant by regulating in such a
manner as to intrude into the federal field of wholesale
electric energy and capacity price-setting. Furthermore,
Maryland's stated purpose to use the Generation Order to
secure the existence of sufficient and reliable electric
energy for Maryland residents does not permit invasion
into a federally occupied field. Where a state action falls
within a field Congress intended the federal government
alone to occupy, the good intentions and importance of the
state's objective are immaterial to the field preemption
analysis. Field preemption requires the state to "yield to
the force of federal law . . ., notwithstanding that [the
state's action] is constructed upon values familiar to many
and cherished by most, and notwithstanding that it may fit
neatly within or alongside the federal scheme." See French
v. Pan Am Exp., Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989).148
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding
that the MdPSC order was preempted "because it functionally sets
the rate that CPV receives for its sales in the PJM auction.,
149
147. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 831 (D. Md.
2013), aff'd, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
148. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30.
149. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F 3d 467, 476 (4th Cir. 2014).
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2. New Jersey
New Jersey's legislature also foresaw crisis. The legislature found
that "New Jersey is experiencing an electric power capacity deficit
and high power prices." 150 The legislature warned that, "[a]s a result
of a lack of new, efficient electric generation facilities, New Jersey
has become more reliant on coal-fired power plants., 151  The
legislature found that PJM's capacity market "has not resulted in
large additions of peaking facilities or any additions of intermediate
or base load resources available to the region and the State. ' ' 152 New
Jersey concluded that it needed more electric energy generators.
The Long Term Capacity Pilot Program Act empowered New
Jersey's Board of Public Utilities ("Board") to promote the
construction of new power-generating facilities in the state. The
Board crafted a set of contracts similar to Maryland's CfD. 53 The
Third Circuit invalidated the program, finding that the state had
impermissibly entered into a field of regulation within FERC's
exclusive jurisdiction.154 The court acknowledged that states may
select the type of generation to be built-wind or solar, gas or coal-
155
and where to build the facility. States also may elect to build no
electric generation facilities at all. 156 However, the states may not
regulate the rates at which power is sold into wholesale markets.1 57
3. Ohio
158In Ohio, FirstEnergy's utility affiliates filed an application with
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO") to acquire the
150. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
N.J. STAT. § 48:3-98.2(e)).
151. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. § 48:3-98.2(f)).
152. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. § 48:3-98.2(b)).
153. N.J. STAT . § 48:3-98.3(c)(12), invalidated by PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
154. Solomon, 766 F.3d at 252-54.
155. Id. at 255.
156. Id. (citing Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. F.E.R.C., 569 F.3d 477, 481
(D.C. Cir. 2009)).
157. Id. at 247 (citing Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953
(1986)).
158. Application, In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Edison Co., et al. for
Auth. to Provide for a Standard Serv. Offer in the Form of an Elec. Sec. Plan, No.
14-1297-EL-SSO (PUCO Aug. 4, 2014).
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output from existing nuclear and coal-fired generation assets from a
merchant affiliate through a purchased power transaction. 159  The
acquired generation would be sold into the PJM markets and the
utilities' net costs or revenues would be recovered or credited
through retail rates. 16  FirstEnergy argued that the agreement was
necessary in order to avoid premature retirement of plants that could
provide long-term benefits to Ohio customers. 161 As of April 9, 2015,
litigation relating to the FirstEnergy proposal was still pending.
AEP's utility affiliates filed a similar application with PUCO to
purchase power from a marketing affiliate. 162 In AEP's case, PUCO
authorized the utility to include a "placeholder rider" in its tariff but
did not approve the recovery of any specific costs. In a future
proceeding, AEP will be required to justify the recovery of costs
associated with specific power purchase agreements. In such
proceedings, AEP must address, at a minimum, the following factors,
which PUCO "will balance, but not be bound by, in deciding whether
to approve the Company's request for cost recovery":
" financial need of the generating plant;
" necessity of the generating facility, in light of future
reliability concerns, including supply diversity;
159. The Companies propose to purchase the output of two generating plants
operated by FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. ("FES") - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station ("Davis-Besse") in Oak Harbor, Ohio and W.H. Sammis Plant ("Sammis")
in Stratton, Ohio (collectively, the "Plants") - as well as FES's entitlement to the
output of two generating units owned and operated by Ohio Valley Electric
Corporation ("OVEC"). See Direct Testimony of Steven E. Strah at 5:13-5:17, In
the Matter of the Application of Ohio Edison Co., et al. for Auth. to Provide for a
Standard Serv. Offer in the Form of an Elec. Sec. Plan, No. 14-1297-EL-SSO
(PUCO Aug. 4, 2014).
160. Id. at 5:1-5:5; Application, supra note 157, at 9.
161. Application, supra note 157, at 1; Direct Testimony of Donald Moul at 4-5,
9, In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Edison Co., et al. for Auth. to Provide
for a Standard Serv. Offer in the Form of an Elec. Sec. Plan, No. 14-1297-EL-SSO
(PUCO Aug. 4, 2014).
162. Ohio Power Company's Electric Security Plan, In the Matter of the
Application of Ohio Power Co. for Auth. to Provide for a Standard Serv. Offer in
the Form of an Elec. Sec. Plan, No. 13-2385-EL-SSO (PUCO Dec. 20, 2013).
Ohio Power proposes a non-bypassable rider to recover from retail customers the
net costs or revenues accruing to AEP Ohio from the sale of its OVEC entitlement
into the PJM market (including energy, capacity, ancillaries, etc.) less all costs
associated with the Company's OVEC entitlement. Id. at 8-9.
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" description of how the generating plant is compliant with
all pertinent environmental regulations and its plan for
compliance with pending environmental regulations; and
" the impact that a closure of the generating plant would have
on electric prices and the resulting effect on economic
development within the state.163
PUCO did not address the Supremacy Clause issue, finding that it
was "best reserved for judicial determination. '" 164
C. New York
The NYPSC recently stepped in to prevent "mothballing 1 65 of two
generating assets - NRG Energy, Inc.'s coal-fired Dunkirk
generating station in Dunkirk, NY ("Dunkirk"), and Cayuga
Operating Company, LLC's coal-fired Cayuga generating facility in
Lansing, NY (Cayuga) - that do not earn enough revenue in the
wholesale market to continue operating, but are needed for reliability.
The NYPSC determined that the Dunkirk and Cayuga units should
remain operational for an interim period until longer-term solutions
can be implemented. 166
The reliability support agreement for the Dunkirk facility requires
the asset owner, NRG, to defer mothballing actions and to operate
163. In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to
Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143, in the Form of an
Electric Security Plan, Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO, slip op. at 25 (PUCO Feb. 25,
2015), reh 'gpending.
164. Id., slip op. at 26 ("Some of the parties have also raised the issue of federal
preemption. The Commission declines to address constitutional issues raised by the
parties in these proceedings, as, under the specific facts and circumstances of these
cases, such issues are best reserved for judicial determination").
165. Order Deciding Reliability Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and
Recovery at n.2, Petition of Dunkirk Power LLC & NRG Energy, Inc. for Waiver
of Generator Retirement Requirements, No. 12-E-0136 (NYPSC Aug. 16, 2012)
("The term 'mothball' is synonymous with a 'retirement' for purposes of
providing notice... . However, ... 'mothballing,' in comparison to
'retirement' may have unique implications for establishing appropriate levels
of compensation.").
166. Id. at 26; Order Deciding Reliability Issues and Addressing Cost
Allocation and Recovery, Petition of Cayuga Operating Co., LLC to Mothball
Generating Units ] & 2, No. 12-E-0400 (NYPSC Dec. 17, 2012).
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and maintain the unit until May 31, 2015.167 It includes a Fixed-Cost
Charge of approximately $2.1 million/month, 168 to be recovered in
retail rates. 169 The NYPSC explained that "it is essential that the
mothballing or retirement of generation units that are subject to a
lightened regulatory regime do not jeopardize the reliability of the
electric system. We have taken the necessary steps herein to ensure
the procurement of sufficient generation facilities necessary for the
provision of safe and adequate service, as required under the [New
York] Public Service Law., 170  The NYPSC approved two similar
reliability support service agreements for the Cayuga facility. 171 The
agreement with Cayuga required the asset owner to bid into the New
York Control Area Installed Capacity spot market auctions at a de
minimis price.
Competing suppliers filed a complaint at FERC asserting that the
agreements for the Dunkirk and Cayuga facilities create
impermissible out-of-market payments to prop up otherwise
uneconomic units and will improperly suppress wholesale capacity
market prices. 172 The NYPSC responded that allowing the units to
167. Order Deciding Reliability Need Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and
Recovery at 5, Petition of Dunkirk Power LLC & NRG Energy, Inc. for Waiver of
Generator Retirement Requirements, No. 12-E-0136 (NYPSC May 20, 2013).
168. Id. The agreement also provided for the following adjustments: (a) property
tax costs of up to $13 million to be paid by National Grid for the 24 month period;
(b) a Capacity Revenue True-Up to be paid by NRG to National Grid in the amount
of capacity revenues earned by the RSS Units during the Term of the Agreement;
and (c) a Take or Pay Coal Contract True-Up to be paid by National Grid based
upon actual coal deliveries to the plant. See id.
169. Id. at 6. A portion of the costs also will be submitted for recovery in FERC
jurisdictional transmission rates. Id. at 7.
170. Id. at 7-8.
171. Order Deciding Reliability Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and
Recovery, Petition of Cayuga Operating Co., LLC to Mothball Generating
Units 1 & 2, No. 12-E-0400 (NYPSC Dec. 17, 2012); Order Providing
Clarification and Denying Petition for Rehearing, Petition of Cayuga
Operating Co., LLC to Mothball Generating Units 1 & 2, No. 12-E-0400
(NYPSC July 25, 2014).
172. Complaint of the Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc., Indep.
Power Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., No. EL13-62
(F.E.R.C. May 10, 2013); Motion to Amend, and Amendment to, Complaint of the
Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. Indep. Power Producers of N. Y,
Inc. v. N.Y Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., No. EL13-62 (F.E.R.C. Mar. 25, 2014).
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retire would "create an artificial scarcity in the statewide capacity
market, thereby sending an improperly high price signal."
' 173
NYISO supported the NYPSC and acknowledged that the
reliability needs addressed by agreements "are not otherwise captured
by NYISO capacity market requirements. '" 174 According to NYISO:
Relatively narrow local reliability needs associated with
maintaining the security of the transmission system are
particularly difficult to fully account for within existing
organized markets. When such needs are not captured in a
market's requirements, the market will not set prices at a
level that reflects the marginal costs of satisfying the need.
Thus, a resource that contributes to satisfying the need may
not receive revenues that reflect the full value that its
services provide. In this situation, a capacity resource can
appear to be "uneconomic" when, in fact, it is economic,
but revenue inadequate, because the market requirements
do not include the reliability needs. Dr. Patton[, NYISO's
Independent Market Monitor,] believes that both the
Cayuga and Dunkirk units fall into this category.175
FERC denied the Complaint. FERC agreed with Dr. Patton that "if
the reliability needs satisfied by these units were reflected in the
capacity market, the units would both clear," and that "any provisions
imposed that would cause them not to clear would be
unreasonable. ', 176 However, FERC was concerned that one of the
challenged agreements may procure more capacity than is needed for
short-term reliability, and for a much longer term. According to
FERC:
173. Notice of Intervention and Protest of the New York State Public Service
Commission at 9, Indep. Power Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y Indep. Sys.
Operator, Inc., No. EL13-62 (F.E.R.C. May 30, 2013).
174. Answer of New York Independent System Operator, Inc. at 3, Indep. Power
Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., No. EL13-62 (F.E.R.C.
May 30, 2013) (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
176. Indep. Power Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 150
F.E.R.C. 61,214 at P. 66 (2015).
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We are concerned that if the additional capacity created by
the repowering agreement above the amount needed for
short-term reliability is allowed to offer into the NYISO
capacity market at prices below the cost of repowering,
such capacity might deter new entry or displace less-costly
existing capacity in NYCA. As a result, capacity market
prices could be artificially suppressed. 177
FERC directed NYISO to initiate a stakeholder process to consider
prospective rule changes that would impose minimum bid
requirements on repowering agreements similar to Dunkirk's.
178
Minimum bid requirements can cause a subsidized unit not to clear
the capacity market. In those circumstances, ratepayers may be
forced to pay for the same capacity twice: first they pay the
subsidized unit through the state program, and then they pay the
unsubsidized unit through the wholesale capacity market. Such an
outcome would fail the basic "common sense" test and likely
provoke vociferous consumer complaints.
D. Nuclear Retirements
Nuclear power accounts for 20% of the U.S. electric generation
resource mix and is more than half of the carbon-free generation in
the country. 179  Nuclear power is highly reliable under extreme
weather conditions.18 In January 2014, when gas, coal, and oil-fired
units experienced very high outages, nuclear units performed
relatively very well.1 81 In Georgia, a state with vertically integrated
utilities that are subject to integrated resource planning requirements,
new nuclear generating facilities are being constructed to create fuel
177. Id. at P. 69.
178. Id at P. 71.
179. Transcript of the Joint Meeting of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Grid Reliability at 4:25-
5:2 (May 28, 2014) (discussion of F.E.R.C. Acting Chairman LaFleur).
180. See, e.g., Evan Bayh, Nuclear Energy Plants Well Worth Saving in Illinois,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015, http://chicago.suntimes.com/other-
views/7/71/344004/evan-bayh, archived at http://perma.cc/5AX9-43WG; James
Conca, Polar Vortex - Nuclear Saves The Day, FORBES, Jan. 12, 2014.
181. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POLAR VORTEX REVIEW 13 (2014)
("[T]he polar vortex had the least impact on nuclear plants").
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diversity and help to address long-term energy and environmentalissues such as fossil fuel price volatility and carbon emissions. 182
Yet in the absence of either market reform or some form of subsidy
or out-of-market payment, the owners of nuclear assets have
indicated that significant nuclear retirements could occur in the
jurisdictions with organized capacity markets. According to
FirstEnergy, "total PJM market revenues are not covering the total
annualized costs of nuclear units in any part of PJM."' 183 While five
U.S. nuclear plant construction projects are scheduled to come online
by the end of 2018, all of them are located outside of organized
energy markets. 
184
Commissioner Moeller recently testified:
[N]uclear plants are under increasing economic pressure to
close as a result of record low capacity prices. In addition
to several announced nuclear plant closures, some utilities
have predicted additional retirements if specific units are
unable to operate profitably. Losing these plants has long-
term implications both to the reliability of the system and
on the nation's emission profile.1
85
182. Georgia Power's Application for the Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant
Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, Georgia Power Co., No. 27800-U
(Ga. PSC June 17, 2010).
183. Direct Testimony of Donald Moul at 4:16-17, In the Matter of the
Application of Ohio Edison Co., et al. for Auth. to Provide for a Standard Serv.
Offer in the Form of an Elec. Sec. Plan, No. 14-1297-EL-SSO (PUCO Aug. 4,
2014).
184. Wayne Barber, Current Market Rough on Nuclear, NRC Commissioner
Says, TRANSMISSIONHUB (May 28, 2014), http://www.transmissionhub.com/
articles/2014/05/current-market-rough-on-nuclear-nrc-commissioner-says.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/967F-9YXS.
185. Hearing on "Keeping the Lights On - Are We Doing Enough to Ensure the
Reliability and Security of the U.S. Electric Grid?" Before the S. Comm. on Energy
& Natural Resources, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Philip D. Moeller,
Commissioner, F.E.R.C.).
2015]
514 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W RE VIE W
FERC Commissioner John Norris stated that baseload nuclear
power plants are critical to the nation's power infrastructure and that
it is important to keep them around as a resource.186
The unique advantages of nuclear power are not considered in
organized markets that require these units to compete solely on the
basis of short-term price. 187  In response to questions by Senator
Portman about the January 2014 polar vortex, Chairman LaFleur
acknowledged that FERC needs to make sure that the rules for
capacity markets are written correctly so that base load capacity gets
"what it needs" to remain in service. 188 Yet it is not clear how, under
current market rules, considerations other than short-term marginal
cost will be taken into account.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
Current market rules are not efficiently solving for long-term
energy and environmental goals that remain important to the states.
It is not enough to say that federal law is supreme, and that state
policies must yield to the market-design preferred by FERC. Federal
law assigns to the states important public policy responsibilities that
are broader than the short-term economic interests that remain
FERC's focus.
Legitimate competitive concerns are raised when out-of-market
payments are made to specific resources for public policy reasons. 189
However, when an out-of-market payment is made in order to secure
the resource that achieves an important public policy objective at the
186. See id.; Transcript of the Joint Meeting of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Grid Reliability at 34:19-
35:22 (May 28, 2014) (comments of F.E.R.C.Commissioner Norris).
187. See generally KATHLEEN L. BARRON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FED.
REGULATORY AFFAIRS & WHOLESALE MKT. POLICY, EXELON CORP., NUCLEAR
POWER IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS, NARUC SUMMER MEETINGS (July 15, 2014).
188. Webcast, Hearing on "Keeping the Lights On - Are We Doing Enough to
Ensure the Reliability and Security of the U.S. Electric Grid?" Before the S.
Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Cheryl
A. LaFleur, Acting Chairman, F.E.R.C.), available at
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/4/electric-grid-reliability-
and-security-are-we-doing-enough, archived at http://perma.cc/4UPN-7Z4X.
189. E.g., JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., BRATTLE GROUP, A COMPARISON
OF PJM's RPM WITH ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKET DESIGNS 31
(Sept. 2009).
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least cost, the payment is not necessarily uneconomic or
inefficient. FERC has recognized that out-of-market payments can
be appropriate to maintain short-term reliability. 91 It is not obvious
why out-of-market payments aimed at achieving other important
policy objectives, including, for example, fuel diversity and
environmental objectives, should be viewed differently.
190. See generally Answer of New York Independent System Operator, Inc. at 3,
Indep. Power Producers ofN Y., Inc. v. N. Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., No. EL 13-
62 (F.E.R.C. May 30, 2013); see supra text accompanying note 179.
191. Chairman LaFleur has acknowledged that, while FERC needs to be fuel-
neutral it also must be guided by reliability considerations. Hearing on "Keeping
the Lights On - Are We Doing Enough to Ensure the Reliability and Security of the
U.S. Electric Grid?" Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 113th
Cong. (2014) (testimony of Cheryl A. LaFleur, Acting Chairman, F.E.R.C.),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg87851/html!CHRG-
113shrg87851.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R4PY-N5MG ("I think FERC
should try to be guided by reliability and what the customers need not by a
preference for a particular fuel."). Similarly, Commissioner Moeller recently
testified:
I have long-stated that I can be "fuel-neutral" but I cannot be "reliability-neutral."
That is, I can be neutral as a regulator with regard to how competitive markets
ultimately decide which types of power plants are most efficient and affordable,
regardless of whether those power plants are fueled by water, natural gas, fuel oil,
uranium, coal, wind, the sun or any other fuel. But I cannot be neutral about the
reliability of our electricity.
Hearing on "Keeping the Lights On - Are We Doing Enough to Ensure the
Reliability and Security of the U.S. Electric Grid? " Before the S. Comm. on Energy
& Natural Resources, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Philip D. Moeller,
Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
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